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The authority of subnational governments and international institutions has grown con-
siderably over the past 65 years. Cross-sectional variation has not diminished, but where 
change has taken place it has been largely in the direction of multilevel governance. Europe 
has been the epicenter of this development, and hence this chapter focuses primarily on 
Europe and the OECD world, but developments elsewhere will be briefly discussed as well.
Europe’s experiment with its political structure is rooted in the disaster of World War 
II. Not one of the six founding states of the European Economic Community had escaped 
military defeat and foreign occupation. Institutions that were considered utopian before 
the war now seemed worth trying. The outcome, half a century later, is an unstable and 
contested reallocation of authority to the European level. The process has been two 
sided. Authority—the competence to make binding decisions that are regarded as legiti-
mate—has been diffused to subnational governments even in countries that do not harbor 
national minorities (Goldsmith and Page 2010; Hooghe et al. 2010).
The simultaneous centralization of authority in a continental polity and decentraliza-
tion to subnational regions reveals that the standard toolkit of political science cannot 
fully grasp what is going on. The European Union (EU) appears to break the mould of the 
state, but is not a state itself. Rather, in Stephan Leibfried’s metaphor, it is akin to a ship 
with a single hull but masted with national flags. Hull up, it appears to be supranational, 
but viewed from the opposite direction, from the masts down, it is an intergovernmental 
confederation of states (Leibfried et al. 2009). The EU is “less than a state, but more than an 
international organization” (Sbragia 1992), a “composite” polity (Tarrow 2001), a “condo-
minio” or “consortio” (Schmitter 1996), a “regulatory state” (Majone 1996), a “post-modern 
state” (Caporaso 1996), or a “compound polity” (Fabbrini 2007). Decentralization in coun-
tries such as France, Italy, Spain, or the United Kingdom (UK) is a clear departure from a 
unitary national state, but is less than federal. The outcome is described as quasi-unitary, 
quasi-federal, or federalizing, all of which are terms that take one into the grey area 
between unitary and divided sovereignty.
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The literatures on Europeanization and decentralization meet around the idea that 
authority has become multi-layered, but beyond this lies disagreement. What is the logic 
of decision-making in this new (dis)order? Who is driving the process? And what are the 
effects for state sovereignty?
In Section 1 we draw on theories of European integration to position ourselves on 
these questions before examining, in Section 2, how authority has shifted in Europe. In 
Sections 3 and 4 we engage the principal explanations and survey subnational decentrali-
zation beyond Europe. Section 5 concludes by exploring the implications for the state and 
for national sovereignty.
1 Theories of European Integration
The fundamental reason for international governance is that interaction among national 
communities creates problems that demand collective decision-making. The diversity of 
such problems reflects the depth and scope of interaction. According to this functional 
line of thinking, international governance in general, and European integration in par-
ticular, reduces the costs of providing international public goods.
However, governance is also an expression of community. Citizens care—passion-
ately—about who exercises authority over them. The functional need for coordination 
rarely coincides with the territorial scope of community. Communities demand self rule, 
and a preference for self rule is inconsistent with the functional demand for supranational-
ism. This tension has shaped European integration and the fate of the national state.
The founders of the EU were pragmatic. This reflected facts on the ground. While sev-
eral influential political leaders, including Jean Monnet and Walter Hallstein, had supra-
national ambitions, they realized that they were in the minority and could not appeal to 
an emergent European identity. Their strategy, and the strategy of integrationists who 
followed them, was to mobilize support for concrete projects such as the customs union, 
common agricultural policy, and the social fund. Their efforts were phenomenally suc-
cessful, but what can account for the speed and breadth of regional integration in Europe 
in the 1950s and 1960s? How could rapid jurisdictional reform take place among embedded 
national states?
Functionalism conceives a mismatch between the international scale of human prob-
lems and the national scale of states as a force for supranational integration, but says little 
about how this mismatch is resolved. Neofunctionalists argue that transnational inter-
est groups demand international governance to reap (mainly economic) benefits. Once 
set in motion, the process is self-reinforcing. As integration deepens and supranational 
institutions gain power, more transnational interests are created. Supranational actors 
themselves demand more authority. Progress in one policy area spills over and gives rise to 
pressures for integration in other areas.
After the debacle of Charles de Gaulle’s opposition to supranationalism and the empty 
chair crisis of 1965–66, neofunctionalist predictions appeared too rosy. The most influen-
tial alternative approach—intergovernmentalism—describes a family of theories that con-
ceive regional integration as an outcome of bargaining among national states. The puzzle 
was not the speed or breadth of regional integration, but the decision of national states 
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to create an international regime in the first place. Given their power and resources, why 
should states pool authority? Stanley Hoffmann argued that states would not swim far in 
supranational waters. They might be prepared to integrate on matters of low politics if the 
gains were evident, but on many issues, including those that engage national sovereignty, 
“[a] mbiguity may arouse and stiffen national consciousness into nationalism” (1966: 882; 
also Rosamond 2000: 78).
The main intergovernmental line was to bring regional integration back into the realm of 
“normal” international relations theory. The authority exercised by European institutions 
is pooled or delegated by the member states to make commitments. Intergovernmentalists 
link national preference formation to strategic bargaining between states in a two-level 
game. National interests are framed in domestic political conflict and, once formulated, 
are bargained in intergovernmental fora.
The debate between neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism was interlaced 
with a discussion about the nature of the beast and, by implication, about the appropriate 
categories of analysis. Is European integration best conceived as a means for coping with 
international interdependence, or is more to be gained from analyzing the EU as a federal 
polity? Should one use the language of international relations or the language of compara-
tive politics?
In the late 1990s, the debate on Europe’s jurisdictional architecture converged on the 
view that European integration had transformed a network of sovereign national states 
into a system of multilevel governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Kohler-Koch and Eising 
1999; Jachtenfuchs 2001). Literature on multilevel governance extends the notion of real-
location of authority to decision-making within, as well as among, national states (Bache 
and Flinders 2004; Enderlein et al. 2010; Piattoni 2010). There are (almost) as many defi-
nitions of multilevel governance as there are users of the term, but common to all is the 
idea that authority on a broad swathe of issues has come to be shared across global insti-
tutions, regional organizations such as the EU, national governments, and subnational 
governments.
2 Multilevel Authority
Figure 14.1 reveals how formal rules concerning national/EU decision-making across 18 
policy areas have evolved from the 1955 Rome Treaty to the 2005 Constitutional Treaty, 
as charted by Tanja Börzel (2005). Breadth of integration refers to the range of policies or 
tasks for which the EU plays a role; depth of integration refers to the supranational or inter-
governmental character of the decision rules. There is wide variation across policy areas, 
as suggested in the size of the box plots representing the 5 to 95 percent range for breadth 
and depth. As one would expect, policies that redistribute income among individuals are 
handled almost exclusively within national states, whereas policies having to do with trade 
and market integration are handled almost exclusively at the European level. A startling 
fact about the pattern in Figure 14.1 is that there is not one case where a policy has been 
shifted from the European to the national level, nor is there a case where a policy that was 
supranational has become intergovernmental. At least up to this point in time, the devel-
opment of European governance has been unidirectional.
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Figure 14.2 charts the evolution of regional authority in older and newer EU members 
from 1950 to 2007. Of 27 EU countries in 2007, 21 had become more regionalized. Twenty 
additional levels of regional government had been established, and not one disestablished. 
The number of elected regional assemblies had increased from eight to 20. While regional 
authority in the EU-East is considerably lower than in the EU-West, decentralization has 
increased sharply since the collapse of Communism.
Variation across regions shows no signs of declining over time. Some countries have no 
regional level. Others have authoritative regional governments that play a decisive role not 
only in their respective regions but also in the country as a whole. Of the 27 EU member 
states, six had no regional tier,1 ten had a single tier, ten had two regional tiers, and one, 
Germany, had three in 2007. There has been no convergence in regional government but, 
rather, continuing and wide divergence.
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Fig.  14.1 Evolution of EU authority: policy scope and depth, 1957–2005.
Note: Scope (1–5) estimates the extent to which the EU plays a role in a policy; Depth (1–5) estimates the 
supranational or intergovernmental character of the decision rules. The boxes encompass the interquartile 
range for 18 policies, the horizontal line is the median, and the whiskers indicate the fifth and ninety-fifth 
percentiles. Circles (stars) are cases with values that deviate from the interquartile range by 1.5 (3.0) times the 
interquartile range. The acronym SEA stands for the Single European Act of 1986.
Source: Börzel (2005: 221–223).
1 Defined as a general-purpose tier with an average population ≥ 150,000.
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Fig.  14.2 Regional authority over a long half-century, 1950−2007.
Note: EU-West =  14 countries; EU-East =  10 countries; OECD-other = 9 countries; Latin-America = 21 countries; 
Southeast Asia = 4 countries.
This figure estimates regional authority for intermediate governments with an average population of at least 
150,000. Regional authority is estimated along eight dimensions in two domains:  self rule (the authority 
exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region) and shared rule (the authority exercised 
by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole).
Self rule consists of
	 •	 Institutional depth = extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated;
	 •	 Policy scope = range of policies for which a regional government is responsible;
	 •	 Fiscal autonomy = extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population;
	 •	 Representation = extent to which a region is endowed with an independent legislature and executive.
Shared rule consists of
	 •	 Law-making = extent to which regional representatives co-determine national 
legislation;
	 •	 Executive control = extent to which a regional government co-determines national 
policy in intergovernmental meetings;
	 •	 Fiscal control = extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribu-
tion of national tax revenues;
	 •	 Constitutional	reform	=	extent	to	which	regional	representatives	co-determine	con-
stitutional change.
Sources: Hooghe et al. (2010); Shair-Rosenfield et al. (2014); and  Hooghe et al. (2015).
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Yet this has been an era of subnational empowerment. The scale of change becomes appar-
ent only when one escapes “methodological nationalism” (Jeffery and Wincott 2010), 
which boils regional government down to the categories of the unitary state, confederal-
ism, and federalism. Few countries jumped from one category to another, but many have 
engineered basic reform.
So regionalization is similar to Europeanization in that it is a coherent process of 
change—not a series of independent bargains. Figures 14.1 and 14.2 give credence to the 
claim that the jurisdictional architecture of Europe has become multilevel. But what are 
its causes, and what does this mean for the state in Europe? Over the past two decades 
research on Europe has engaged each of these questions.
3 Explaining Multilevel Governance
Two literatures help us to understand the transformation of authoritative decision-making 
over the past half century. First, public goods theory conceives government as a means to 
provide public goods that would not be produced by the market or by rational citizens act-
ing independently. The structure of government will then reflect the efficient production 
of public goods given their economies of scale and externalities. Pressure for reform arises 
from the tension between actual and efficient government structure. Second, government 
is an expression of community and the demand for self-rule on the part of normatively dis-
tinct, territorially based groups. The structure of government will then reflect the pattern 
of community; pressure for reform will arise when they diverge.2
Public Goods
The first approach builds on the theory of public good provision in which efficient govern-
ance a) internalizes inter-jurisdictional externalities, b) exploits scale economies, and c) 
tailors policy to the heterogeneous preferences of those living in different communities 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009a). Where the externalities and scale economies that arise from 
a problem such as providing clean air, minimizing monetary transaction costs, or reduc-
ing trade barriers are transnational in scope, the most efficient level of decision-making is 
also transnational. Where the externalities and scale economies are local or regional, as for 
garbage collection or land-use planning, the most efficient level is subnational.
Multilevel governance should be very common since the externalities and scale effects of 
most policies provided by government—for example, health, education, economic devel-
opment, spatial planning, environment and welfare services—are diverse. So one would 
expect some policies to be decentralized and others to be centrally provided.
During and immediately after World War II, authority was packaged in highly central-
ized states by the overriding need to mobilize resources for war and to survive scarcity. In 
the post-World War II era, functional pressure for regionalization resulted from a dou-
ble shift in policy portfolios, which moved away from national war-making and towards 
new policies related to economic growth, trade, and welfare; these are policies with widely 
2 A comprehensive analysis would include the effects of regime type and distributional politics.
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varying externalities and economies of scale, which are best conducted at diverse territo-
rial levels. The change was not immediately evident because, in the years following the war, 
central states were called upon to distribute scarcity and to mobilize resources, human 
and financial, to rebuild battered economies. Moreover, jurisdictional arrangements are 
sticky—one must expect a serious lag between change in the environment and change in 
the structure of government.
Most policy areas that have been shifted to the European level follow a functional logic 
rooted in the territorial scope of their externalities and scale economies (see Table 14.1). 
This applies to policies concerned with trade, transport, energy, and competition, in which 
the initial steps toward integration were taken in 1957. In the early decades of the European 
Economic Community (EEC), integration in social and industrial policy were spillovers 
arising from economic integration. In addition, the European Commission played a sig-
nificant role in international trade negotiations, where the benefits of scale are transpar-
ent. This is a field in which the EU can be considered a great power.
Subsequent European integration in environment, research, and immigration also has a 
functional logic. However, a functional explanation gets one only so far. Some policy shifts 
involve political side-payments. These include regional and cohesion policy and agricul-
tural subsidies. The European Commission defends regional policy on efficiency grounds, 
but a survey of Commission officials finds that a majority favor re-nationalization of the 
EU’s agricultural policy and regional policy is low on the wish list for further centraliza-
tion (Kassim et al. 2013).
Moreover, Europeanization does not encompass all policy areas for which there are col-
lective functional benefits, such as defense procurement. Most of the exceptions can be 
explained by the distributional consequences of Europeanization and the capacity of poten-
tial losers, be they national governments or domestic interests, to block reform. While 
neofunctionalist accounts emphasize spillovers, intergovernmentalists highlight the distri-
butional impediments to international cooperation. But neither predicts the constraining 
impact of mass publics—a development which has exerted a serious drag on integration.
Multilevel governance conceives of European integration as part of a broader process 
of authority dispersion, which stretches beneath as well as above the central state. The 
existence of an overarching European market eliminates the fear that regional autonomy 
would result in small, inefficient economic units that might be denied access to former 
markets (Jolly 2007; Piattoni 2010). This has emboldened demands for independence on 
the part of minority nations. Why not gain the benefit of flexibility and responsiveness in a 
small jurisdiction without losing access to a continental-sized market?3 Moreover, the EU 
domesticates international relations in a rule-bound polity, and it gives small states greater 
leverage than they would have in a classic Westphalian system.
The effects are indirect because the EU has no authority over subnational relations in 
its member states. Strong regional governments, such as the German Länder and Spanish 
communidades autónomas, are well placed to gain influence in European decision-making, 
but they also have the most to lose when authority is reallocated to Europe. The European 
Commission has kick-started regional government in some formerly centralized states 
3 A recent report on Welsh independence claims that per capita income would be as much as 39 percent 
higher in Wales had the country achieved independence in 1990. The argument is that small EU countries 
have grown more than larger ones in the last two decades because they reap the advantages of flexibility 
within “the EU’s flotilla-like structure” (Price and Levinger 2011).
Table 14.1 Evolution of EU versus national competence in policy fields
1950 1957 1968 1992 2000 2010
Economic Policy
Goods/services 1 2 3 4 4 4
Agriculture 1 1 4 4 4 4
Capital flows 1 1 1 4 4 4
Persons/workers 1 1 2 3 4 4
Transportation 1 2 2 2 3 3
Energy 1 2 1 2 2 3
Communications 1 1 1 2 3 3
Environment 1 2 2 3 3 4
Regional policy 1 1 1 3 3 3
Competition 1 2 3 3 3 3
Industry 1 2 2 2 3 3
Money/credit 1 1 2 2 5 5
Foreign exchange 1 1 2 2 4 5
Revenue/taxes 1 1 2 2 2 3
Macroeconomic 1 1 2 2 3 4
Social/Industrial Policy
Work conditions 1 1 2 2 3 3
Health 1 1 1 2 2 2
Social welfare 1 2 2 2 2 2
Education and research 1 1 2 2 2 3
Labor relations 1 1 1 1 2 2
Legal-Constitutional Policy
Justice 1 1 1 3 3 3
Citizenship 1 1 1 2 3 3
Participation 1 1 1 2 2 2
Police and order 1 1 1 1 2 2
International Relations/Security
Trade negotiations 1 1 3 5 5 5
Economic-military aid 1 1 1 2 2 3
Diplomacy 1 1 1 2 3 3
Defense and war 1 1 1 2 2 2
Key: 1 = all policy decisions at national level; 2 = only some policy decisions at EU level; 3 = policy decisions 
at both national and EU level; 4 = mostly policy decisions at EU level; 5 = all policy decisions at EU level.
Sources: Estimates for 1950, 1957, and 1968 are from Lindberg and Scheingold (1970; 67-71) 
complemented by Schmitter (1996); estimates for 1992 are from Schmitter (1996: 125-26), 
informed by five experts’ judgements in March 1992; estimates for 2000 are based on Schmitter’s 
(1996: 125-26) projections and post-hoc evaluations by Hooghe and Marks (2001: 187-88); estimates 
for 2010 are made by Hooghe and Marks for this Handbook and based on existing treaty obligations 
and obligations undertaken subsequently. For greater detail on the Lindberg and Scheingold vs. 
Schmitter assessment see Hooghe and Marks (2001).
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through its cohesion policy, which funds economic development in poor EU regions. 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, and Slovakia have regionalized in part to gain access 
to EU funding. However, subnational actors merely implement EU policy in centralized 
countries. In federations and countries with a strong regional tier, EU integration has 
generally led to more cooperation, rather than competition, between regions and central 
government (Tatham 2011). The Committee of the Regions, a consultative assembly of sub-
national leaders across the EU, has issued a Charter for Multilevel Governance that sets out 
principles and methods for involving regions in national and European decision-making. 
The goal is “Europe with the regions,” not “Europe of the regions.”
Multivariate analysis suggests that the effect of European integration on subnational 
authority is muted (Schakel 2009a). Regionalization appears to be more powerfully 
influenced by the logic of policy-making in advanced capitalist society. Regional author-
ity was almost frozen in the years immediately following World War II, but from the 
1970s on, there was a torrent of reform strengthening regional government (Figure 14.2). 
This process of regionalization parallels the growth of government responsibility for 
welfare, microeconomic, environmental, education, health, and transport policy. 
These policies extend the reach of the central state, but, unlike war, they do not com-
press policy-making to the national level. On the contrary, each of these policies has 
diverse externalities and economies of scale and, as a result, these public goods are most 
efficiently delivered at the local and regional levels, as well as by central government 
(Ter-Minassian 1997; Schakel 2010).
Community
Government is palpably shaped by demands on the part of communities to rule them-
selves. Communities—bounded groups of densely interacting humans sharing distinc-
tive cultural norms—may wish to exercise self-rule so that laws are not imposed from the 
outside. Friction between national law and minority norms can generate potent demands 
for jurisdictional reform. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) summarize this 
as a center–periphery cleavage, a durable and sometimes violent clash between peripheral 
communities and state-builders.
Functionalists and neofunctionalists stressed the constraining effects of national iden-
tity on integration. “We are favored by the need and the habit of material cooperation; we 
are hampered by the general clinging to political segregation. How to reconcile these two 
trends, both of them natural and both of them active, is the main problem for political 
invention at this juncture of history” (Mitrany 1948: 151). But they believed that national 
identity would ultimately give way to a more encompassing loyalty. In an early analysis of 
public opinion on European integration, Ronald Inglehart (1967) predicted that a shift of 
loyalties was a matter of generational replacement. Younger cohorts, he argued, were being 
socialized in societies where nationalism was discredited and where supranational institu-
tions were providing an expanding range of collective goods. Recent research arrives at 
a different verdict: identity remains a supremely powerful constraint on preferences con-
cerning the level of European integration (Carey 2002; McLaren 2002; Risse 2009). This is 
true both for political parties and for the general public.
The presence of ethnic or territorial minorities and their effect on jurisdictional design 
within the state is widely acknowledged in the literature. Many minority communities 
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have been assimilated into nations, yet most nations coexist with minority communities 
that retain distinct norms rooted in language, religion, or ethnicity (Keating 1998; Brancati 
2008). Demands for self-rule have intensified with the decline in the share of the vote 
going to major parties and the growth of regional parties. The average regional-level vote 
share for regionalist parties in national elections in 11 countries surveyed by Massetti and 
Schakel (2013) has increased from 4.9 percent in the 1970s to 8.9 percent in the 2000s (see 
also De Winter et al. 2006; Brancati 2008).
4 Multilevel Governance Beyond Europe
Europe has been the prime laboratory for multilevel governance, but the dispersion of 
authority has occurred beyond. Figure 14.2 illustrates that non-OECD countries have 
become more decentralized, as well. The largest changes have taken place in non-federal 
countries. Of 21 Latin American countries, 14 have decentralized, while only two, Cuba 
and Ecuador, centralized over the 1950–2006 period. In Southeast Asia, our measure 
tracks regional authority in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and it 
finds significant increases in all but Malaysia.
Decentralization has been recommended by international institutions, including the 
OECD, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, as a means to increase government 
efficiency and effectiveness. However, this does not explain variation in the timing and 
extent of decentralization across the globe. Democratization and the presence of minority 
communities provide a better grip on when and how countries decentralize.
As in Central and Eastern Europe, regionalization in Latin America and Southeast Asia 
closely tracks democracy. The dip in the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America corresponds to 
the authoritarian turn in all but a handful of countries; of 21 countries, only Costa Rica 
has not experienced authoritarian rule in the past 60 years. The onset of democratization 
came later in Southeast Asia, and this is reflected in the fact that regionalization began in 
earnest only in the early 1990s. Here ethnic diversity has intensified pressure for region-
alization (Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2014). All four countries have introduced or strengthened 
special autonomy statutes for ethnic or religious minorities. Territorially concentrated 
ethnic minorities are much less common in Latin America, though in recent years several 
governments (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela) have conceded 
limited self-rule to indigenous communities.
Multilevel governance has also deepened above the state. Problems generated by 
reciprocal interdependence are deliberated in global forums, but implementation usu-
ally requires coordination among international, national, and subnational governments. 
Climate change policy is a case in point. Global agreements set parameters, but the work 
is done by cities, regions, and localities (Biermann and Pattberg 2012). International insti-
tutions are the topmost levels in an interconnected system in which no level or organi-
zation operates unilaterally. As Michael Zürn observes in the introduction to Part II 
(Chapter 10, this volume), the international system has been transformed into a system of 
multilevel governance in which tasks are differentiated by sector rather than segmented 
across tiers.
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International governance has become more supranational as well as multilevel (Cooper 
et al. 2008; Kahler and Lake 2009). Forty-one of the 72 most authoritative international 
organizations (IOs), including the World Trade Organization (WTO), the IMF, the 
World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, make important policy decisions by super-majority (Hooghe and 
Marks 2014). General secretariats have gained authority in several leading trade organi-
zations, including the South African Development Community and the EU, and interna-
tional courts have seen increasing rates of litigation (Alter 2012). The upshot is a “dense 
network of international and transnational institutions of unprecedented quality and 
quantity . . . that are far more intrusive than conventional international institutions. They 
can circumvent the resistance of most governments via majoritarian decision making, or 
by dispute settlement procedures through the interaction of monitoring agencies with 
transnational society, and by dominating the process of knowledge interpretation” (Zürn 
2012: 734).
Whereas governance within the state is chiefly general-purpose, designed around par-
ticular communities, international governance is biased towards task-specific govern-
ment, designed around particular problems (Hooghe and Marks 2009b). General-purpose 
government above the state is limited to regional subsets of states and populations that 
have some normative commonality, shared values, and minimal levels of trust, and it has 
been growing in number over the past few decades. Just 16 of the 72 most authoritative 
international organizations are general-purpose organizations,4 and all cater to regionally 
specific groups of countries. The United Nations is the one global organization that comes 
closest to general-purpose government, but it is authoritatively weak outside its core area 
of international security.
Kathy Powers and Gary Goertz identify 35 “regional economic institutions” in existence 
in 2011, 14 of which have been established since 1985. Newcomers include the East African 
Community, Mercosur, and the Community of Independent States. While trade is usually 
at the core of these organizations, they “are often the go-to place when new problems arise” 
(2011: 2396). However, they are markedly less supranational than task-specific organiza-
tions. The default decision rule in a regional IO is consensus. In this respect, the EU is an 
outlier (Hooghe and Marks 2014).
The weakness of authoritative general-purpose governance beyond the state—pace the 
EU—has stark consequences. Task-specific government is oriented toward Pareto optimal-
ity; it works best where distributional conflict is not especially intense. General-purpose 
government, by contrast, is appropriate for decisions that redistribute resources and where 
trade-offs across policies can facilitate agreement. Since general-purpose government is 
weak at the global level, public goods with distributional consequences are underprovided.
4 Defined as an organization having competencies in 15 or more of 25 possible policy fields. An IO is 
coded as having competence in a policy area if it meets two or more of the following criteria: a) the policy 
is mentioned in the constitution/founding documents; b) the IO has a distinct organizational component 
for the policy (agency, department, office, unit); c) the IO collects or spends money on policy (budget 
category, taxes, fees, fines, penalties); d) there is a consistent policy pattern (laws, decisions, regulations, 
conventions, protocols, rulings); e) the policy is in the mission self-description on the IGO (international 
governmental organization) website. Policy scope was assessed by two independent coders for each of 72 
IGOs from a list of 25 policies. Krippendorff’s alpha is 0.70, which indicates reasonably high intercoder 
reliability.
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Whereas general-purpose governance is tuned to the linkages across poli-
cies, task-specific governance is tuned to linkages across levels. The challenge for 
general-purpose governance is coordination across levels. The challenge for task-specific 
governance is coordination across policies. A  consequence is that coordination among 
task-specific organizations in the international arena is generally poor, and so negative 
externalities—for example, those created by the WTO for public health, the environment, 
or labor rights—may not be sufficiently taken into account.
There is a paradox here. National states facilitate IOs because these institutions aggregate 
preferences and make authoritative decisions for millions of individuals, yet IOs constrain 
international government on grounds of national sovereignty and the demand to be able to 
veto decisions. The result is an ongoing tension between efforts to reap the benefits of scale 
while adapting to the demand for self rule of national, regional, and local communities.
5 Good-Bye to National Sovereignty?
The evidence presented in this chapter reveals that the jurisdictional architecture of the 
EU-polity has become multilevel and that the structure of government reflects a tension 
between functional pressures and identity (Hooghe and Marks 2009a; Schakel 2009b). 
But one could equally assert that national states remain the ultimate arbiters of authority 
and therefore retain sovereignty. States that retain a final say on the allocation of decision 
rights can deepen multilevel governance, so the claim that we live in a world of sovereign 
states does not tell us much about who exerts authority over most decisions. Multilevel 
governance does not negate national sovereignty, but it does reduce its descriptive power.
A sovereign state is, first of all, the ultimate authority within its borders. This has never 
applied to federal states where the constituent units can veto constitutional change. Watts 
(2008: 169) observes that the fundamental principle of federalism would be undermined “if 
a regional government acting alone had the unilateral right to leave the federation, or the 
federation had the unilateral right to expel a regional unit.”
Today there are barely more federal regimes than there were in 1950. However, the fed-
eral-unitary state dichotomy does not capture the significant decentralization of authority 
to regional governments that has actually taken place (Hooghe and Marks 2013). In the 
UK, the Government of Wales Act (1999) and the Scotland Act (1999) assert that no recom-
mendation shall be made to Parliament to revoke or vary the act “unless such a draft has 
also been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, the Assembly” (or Parliament in 
Scotland). The Åland Islands have a similar guarantee within Finland, the Faroe Islands 
within Denmark, and Sarawak and Sabah within Malaysia. Ultimate authority can be 
complicated in ways that escape the unitary/federal dichotomy. Moreover, a constitutional 
analysis, no matter how detailed, does not provide a balanced account of the reallocation 
of authority over the past half century. The constitutional powers of regional governments 
have not changed in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Poland, Romania, or Slovakia, but in each country the authority of regional governments 
to shape policy has significantly increased.
External sovereignty, or the notion that the state is the commander of last resort in rela-
tions with external actors, has also been resistant to change. This is the view of realists, who 
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regard IOs as contracts among national states, and legal scholars, who regard sovereignty as 
indivisible. The argument that the national state has not lost external sovereignty focuses on 
the political limit situation. Sovereignty, in this view, is not the sum of authoritative compe-
tences, but “the quality of a power that has no superior.” In the last analysis, a member state 
of the EU is a member at its own discretion. If it wished, it could exit. In this view, European 
law bites because the member states voluntarily wish it to do so. Michael Troper, a French 
constitutional scholar, writes that “[t] he binding force of European law is not explained as 
an expression of the will of European authorities. It comes from the French constitution 
alone and is, therefore, an expression of the will of the French people” (2010: 150).
Several national constitutions appear to open the door to fragmented sovereignty. The 
1946 Preamble of the French constitution, which remains in force today, maintains that 
“Subject to reciprocity, France shall consent to the limitations upon its sovereignty nec-
essary to the organization and preservation of peace.” The Italian constitution agrees in 
principle to “limitations of sovereignty where they are necessary to allow for a legal sys-
tem of peace and justice among nations.” These statements can be regarded as self-lim-
itations amendable by (national) constitutional processes. This is the line taken by the 
German Constitutional Court in its 30 June 2009 Lissabon ruling that European law 
cannot have primacy over the German Basic Law if there is a conflict (Decisions of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, vol. 123: 267 ff.). In a 2006 ruling, the French Constitutional 
Council ruled that “the transposition of a directive may not run counter to a rule or prin-
ciple inherent in the constitutional identity of France, except when the constituting power 
consents thereto” (quoted in Troper 2010: 146).
But as Neil MacCormick (2010) notes, exit from the EU requires negotiation. Who is the 
“commander of last resort” in the dark and untrodden zone of disentangling a state from 
the Union?5 Which body is the ultimate arbiter of disputes that might arise in allocating 
the collective costs of exit? We seem to be confronted with overlapping legal-constitutional 
orders. According to national law, states are bound by EU law because they confer this 
right by their own constitutional rules. According to the European Court of Justice, the 
“Community constitutes a new legal order . . . for the benefit of which the States have lim-
ited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields” (Van Gend & Loos vs. Administratie 
der Belastingen Case 26/62—5 February 1963).
The EU avoids clashes with its member states by seeking consensus even under majori-
tarian rules, by allowing derogations to treaty commitments, by legislating by directives 
that bind in goals but not means, and by using soft law; in short, the EU operates by a “flex-
ible combination of cooperation, competition and control” (Benz 2010: 220).
National states remain the most important arenas for the exercise of authority, and they 
show no signs of disappearing. However, they have shed authority to governments within 
and without. A member state always has the option of leaving the EU, but the immense cost 
of this reduces its weight in decision-making, including decision-making about whether 
to regard EU law as supreme. There is, in other words, an observational tension between 
national sovereignty, which can be said to be unaltered, and central state authority, which 
has changed a lot.
5 Greenland, a special autonomous region of Denmark, exited the EU in 1985, but this has little to say 
about member state exit.
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This tension is prefigured in the contract theory of the state and the notion that 
while the state is authoritative, it is the result of the free choice of its members. 
Hobbes argued that even though individuals are subject to rules laid down in a com-
pact, they remain in ultimate control of their fate:  “[A] ll actions which men do in 
Commonwealths, for fear of the law, are actions which the doers had liberty to omit” 
(Hobbes 1960 [1651]: Chapter 21). Thomas Hobbes claims that an individual is un-free 
only if he is physically forced. “[W]hen a man throweth his goods into the sea for fear 
the ship should sink, he doth it nevertheless very willingly, and may refuse to do it if he 
will; it is therefore the action of one that was free: so a man sometimes pays his debt, 
only for fear of imprisonment, which, because no body hindered him from detaining, 
was the action of a man at liberty.” The implication is that if a state is not coercively 
forced to remain part of a union, it is sovereign. The point is an important one, though 
sovereignty in this conception is a poor guide to the choices that states—or individu-
als—actually make.
The building of modern states in Europe took several centuries. Many regions in federal 
countries, such as Germany and Austria, and heavily regionalized countries, such as Italy 
and Spain, were once independent, sovereign units. By contrast, the period from the foun-
dation of the European Coal and Steel Community to the present is around 60 years, a fact 
that throws into sharp relief both the extraordinary pace of change in recent decades and 
the necessarily tentative nature of our attempts to draw definitive conclusions about the 
process.
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